Judgments of the Supreme Court

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2018 (Ju) 1626

Date of the judgment (decision)

2019.08.09

Case Number

2018 (Ju) 1626

Reporter

Minshu Vol. 73, No. 3

Title

Judgment concerning the case regarding the meaning of the "time that person's heir comes to know of the commencement of inheritance for himself/herself" as mentioned in Article 916 of the Civil Code

Case name

Case of opposition to grant of a certificate of execution

Result

Judgment of the Second Petty Bench, dismissed

Court of the Prior Instance

Osaka High Court, Judgment of June 15, 2018

Summary of the judgment (decision)

The "time that person's heir comes to know of the commencement of inheritance for himself/herself" as mentioned in Article 916 of the Civil Code means the time that an heir of a person who died without making acceptance or renunciation of inheritance comes to know of the fact that he/she has succeeded to the status of an heir in the inheritance, which said person who died neither accepted nor renounced, through the inheritance from said person who died.

References

Article 916 of the Civil Code

Civil Code
Article 916 If an heir dies without having made acceptance or renunciation of inheritance, the period of paragraph (1) of the preceding Article shall be calculated from the time that person's heir comes to know of the commencement of inheritance for himself/herself.

Main text of the judgment (decision)

The final appeal is dismissed.
The costs of the final appeal shall be borne by the appellant of final appeal.

Reasons

Concerning the reasons for a petition for acceptance of final appeal stated by the counsel for final appeal, SETO Yoshinori, and the subagent for final appeal, KISHIDA Maki (except for those excluded)

1. The outline of facts lawfully determined by the court of prior instance is as follows.

(1) Mizuho Bank, Ltd. filed an action to demand that Minami Osaka Shokuniku Ichiba Kabushiki Kaisha pay loans, etc. and that each of A and four other persons pay 80,000,000 yen, respectively, as performance of joint and several suretyship for obligations pertaining to the aforementioned loans, etc. On June 7, 2012, the court rendered a judgment that upheld all the claims of Mizuho Bank, and the same judgment became final and binding after that (hereinafter this judgment is referred to as the "Final and Binding Judgment").

(2) A. A died on June 30, 2012. A's heirs were his wife and two children, but the children's statements of renunciation of inheritance were accepted in September 2012.

B. Due to the aforementioned renunciation of inheritance, A's four siblings and seven children of A's two siblings who had already died (11 persons in total) became A's heirs. However, the statements of renunciation of inheritance of nine of these heirs, not including B (A's younger brother) and one other heir, were accepted in June 2013.

(3) On October 19, 2012, B died without providing a statement of renunciation of inheritance for the inheritance from A, not knowing that he had become A's heir. B's heirs were his wife, the appellee who is his child, and one other person. The appellee came to know of the fact that the appellee became B's heir around October 19, 2012.

(4) In June 2015, Mizuho Bank transferred the claims pertaining to the Final and Binding Judgment and notified Minami Osaka Shokuniku Ichiba of the aforementioned transfer of the claims by content-certified mail.

(5) A. On November 2, 2015, the appellant, who is the successor of Mizuho Bank, received the grant of a certificate of execution of succession to the effect that the appellant may compulsorily execute the claims pertaining to the original of the Final and Binding Judgment (hereinafter referred to as the "Title of Obligation") against the appellee, who is A's successor, to the extent of one-thirty-second of the amount of the claims based on the Title of Obligation.

B. On November 11, 2015, the appellee received services of the Title of Obligation, a transcript of the aforementioned certificate of execution of succession, etc. (hereinafter referred to as the "Services"). By the Services, the appellee came to know of the fact that B was A's heir and the appellee had succeeded to the status of A's heir from B.

(6) On February 5, 2016, the appellee provided a statement of renunciation of inheritance with regard to the inheritance from A, and the aforementioned statement was accepted on February 12, 2016 (hereinafter this renunciation of inheritance is referred to as the "Renunciation of Inheritance").

2. This case is an action to oppose the grant of a certificate of execution, in which the appellee seeks prohibition of the appellant's compulsory execution against the appellee based on the Title of Obligation, to which the certificate of execution was granted, on the grounds of the Renunciation of Inheritance. Regarding the secondary inheritance (the case where X died, and Y, who is X's heir, died without making acceptance or renunciation of the inheritance from X, and as a result, Z became Y's heir), Article 916 of the Civil Code provides that the three-month period, during which an heir should accept or renounce inheritance, as provided in Article 915, paragraph (1) of the same Code (hereinafter referred to as the "period for careful consideration") should be counted from the "time that person's heir comes to know of the commencement of inheritance for himself/herself." In this case, the parties dispute over the point in time from when the period for careful consideration for the appellee pertaining to the inheritance from A should be counted.

3. The court of prior instance determined as described below based on the aforementioned facts, and concluded that the appellee's claim should be upheld.

The "time that person's heir comes to know of the commencement of inheritance for himself/herself" as mentioned in Article 916 of the Civil Code means the time that Z comes to know of the commencement of the inheritance from Y for himself/herself. However, the same Article should be considered to be based on the premise of the case where Y had known of the fact that he/she is X's heir but died without making acceptance or renunciation of the inheritance, and the same Article is not applicable to this case in which B died without knowing of the fact that he had become A's heir. The point in time from when the period for careful consideration for the appellee pertaining to the inheritance from A should be counted is to be determined under Article 915 of the same Code. Accordingly, the period for careful consideration for the appellee pertaining to the inheritance from A is counted from the time that the appellee came to know of the fact that the appellee had succeeded to the status of A's heir from B, and the Renunciation of Inheritance is valid as one that was given within the period for careful consideration.

4. However, the aforementioned determination of the court of prior instance concerning the interpretation and application of Article 916 of the Civil Code cannot be upheld for the following reasons.

(1) The system of acceptance or renunciation of inheritance does not force an heir to succeed to the rights and obligations of a decedent but gives an heir an opportunity to choose whether to succeed to the inherited property from a decedent. The period for careful consideration is a period during which an heir investigates the existence or non-existence of positive and negative property and the situation thereof, etc. with regard to property to be inherited from a decedent and gives careful consideration thereof before choosing either acceptance or renunciation of the inheritance. If an heir does not know of the fact that he/she has become an heir of a decedent, he/she cannot choose either acceptance or renunciation of the inheritance from the decedent. Therefore, the "time that person's heir comes to know of the commencement of inheritance for himself/herself," which the main clause of Article 915, paragraph (1) of the Civil Code provides as the point in time from when the period for careful consideration is counted, is, in principle, considered to be the time that an heir comes to know of the fact that is a cause of the commencement of inheritance and the fact that he/she has become an heir due to that fact (see 1982 (O) No. 82, the judgment of the Second Petty Bench of the Supreme Court of April 27, 1984, Minshu Vol. 38, No. 6, at 698).

(2) The purport of Article 916 of the Civil Code should be considered to guarantee Z's opportunity to choose either acceptance or renunciation of the inheritance from X by setting the point in time from when Z's period for careful consideration pertaining to the inheritance from X should be counted based on Z's recognition, taking into account that if Y died without having made acceptance or renunciation of the inheritance from X, Z, who has succeeded to the status of X's heir from Y, would be required to choose either acceptance or renunciation of the inheritance from X.

Z, who is the secondary heir, cannot naturally know of the fact that Y was X's heir even if Z comes to know of the commencement of the inheritance from Y for himself/herself. In addition, Z succeeded to the status of Y, who could have chosen either acceptance or renunciation of the inheritance from X through the inheritance from Y, but Z cannot choose either acceptance or renunciation of the inheritance from X if Z himself/herself does not know of the fact that Y was X's heir. If the period for careful consideration pertaining to the inheritance from X is counted from the time that Z comes to know of the commencement of the inheritance from Y for himself/herself despite the fact that Z does not know of the fact that Z succeeded to the status of X's heir from Y, it goes against the purport of Article 916 of the Civil Code that guarantees Z's opportunity to choose either acceptance or renunciation of the inheritance from X.

For the reasons described above, the "time that person's heir comes to know of the commencement of inheritance for himself/herself" as mentioned in Article 916 of the Civil Code should be considered to mean the time that an heir of a person who died without making acceptance or renunciation of inheritance comes to know of the fact that he/she has succeeded to the status of an heir in the inheritance, which said person who died neither accepted nor renounced, through the inheritance from said person who died.

Incidentally, it is clear, from the aforementioned purport of Article 916 of the Civil Code and the fact that the same Article provides a situation where it is applicable only as the case where "an heir dies without having made acceptance or renunciation of inheritance," that the same Article is applicable to the point in time from when Z's period for careful consideration pertaining to the inheritance from X should be counted, irrespective of whether Y had known of the fact that he/she was X's heir.

(3) According to the aforementioned facts, the appellee came to know of the fact that the appellee had succeeded to the status of A's heir from B by the Services on November 11, 2015. Therefore, the appellee's period for careful consideration pertaining to the inheritance from A is counted from the time of the Services. In that case, the Renunciation of Inheritance, for which a statement was provided on February 5, 2016, is valid as one that was given within the period for careful consideration.

5. For the reasons described above, the aforementioned determination of the court of prior instance contains illegality of the erroneous interpretation and application of Article 916 of the Civil Code. However, the determination of the court of prior instance to the effect that the Renunciation of Inheritance is valid as one that was given within the period for careful consideration can be accepted in conclusion. The arguments made by the counsel and the subagent are not acceptable.

Accordingly, the Court unanimously decides as set forth in the main text.

Presiding Judge

Justice KANNO Hiroyuki

Justice YAMAMOTO Tsuneyuki

Justice MIURA Mamoru

Justice KUSANO Koichi

(This translation is provisional and subject to revision.)