Judgments of the Supreme Court

Search Results

2021 (A) 1

Date of the judgment (decision)

2021.09.07

Case Number

2021 (A) 1

Reporter

Keishu Vol. 75, No. 9

Title

Judgment concerning the case in which the court determined that the judgment in prior instance that quashed the judgment in first instance to the effect that the accused was in a state of diminished capacity on the grounds of an erroneous finding of facts, and found that the accused had full capacity for liability without conducting examination of facts and made its own decision, is in violation of the proviso to Article 400 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

Case name

Case charged for theft

Result

Judgment of the Third Petty Bench, quashed and remanded

Court of the Prior Instance

Tokyo High Court, Judgment of November 25, 2020

Summary of the judgment (decision)

Regarding the judgment in first instance that determined that the accused was in a state of diminished capacity as there remains the reasonable suspicion that the accused's ability to control his/her own behavior was extremely diminished, the judgment in prior instance determined that the finding of the judgment in first instance is unreasonable in light of logical law and the rules of thumb, etc., and quashed the judgment in first instance on the grounds of an erroneous finding of facts. The court of prior instance also immediately found that the accused had the full capacity for liability based only on the case records and evidence examined by the court of first instance without conducting examination of facts by itself, and made its own decision. The judgment in prior instance is thus in violation of the proviso to Article 400 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

References

Article 400 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

Code of Criminal Procedure
Article 400 When the court of second instance reverses the judgment of the court of first instance on grounds other than those set forth in the preceding two articles, a judgment shall be rendered to remand the case to the court of first instance, or to transfer the case to a court which is equal to the court of first instance; provided, however, that the court of second instance may render an additional judgment on the case when it finds that it possible to do so based on the case records and the evidence examined by the court of first and second instances.

Main text of the judgment (decision)

The judgment in prior instance is quashed.

This case is remanded to the Tokyo High Court.

Reasons

Of the reasons for final appeal stated by the defense counsel, YAMAMOTO Mamoru, ENDO Naoya, and AKAGI Ryutaro, the argument of violation of a judicial precedent cites a judicial precedent that addressed a different type of facts and is irrelevant in this case, and other arguments, including the argument of violation of the Constitution, are substantially arguments of a mere violation of laws and regulations and an erroneous finding of facts, and do not constitute any of the reasons for a final appeal as referred to in Article 405 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

However, as a result of the Court's examination by its authority in consideration of the defense counsel's arguments, the judgment in prior instance should inevitably be quashed pursuant to Article 411, item (i) of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the following reasons.

1. The summary of the charged facts of this case is that the accused stole 10 food items at a supermarket.

The judgment in first instance determined as follows: the accused is suspected of having been affected with serious kleptomania and having possessed extremely diminished ability to resist the impulse to commit thefts due to the influence of kleptomania, and there remains the reasonable suspicion that the accused's ability to control his/her own behavior was extremely diminished; therefore, the accused was in a state of diminished capacity at the time of the crime of this case. Based on this determination, the judgment in first instance sentenced the accused to imprisonment for four months.

2. The public prosecutor filed an appeal to the court of second instance against the judgment in first instance and argued an erroneous finding of facts.

The judgment in prior instance determined as follows: even if the accused was affected with kleptomania at the time of the crime of this case, he/she can be considered to have retained the ability to control his/her own behavior to a considerable extent in light of the circumstances of the crime, and it can be said that the accused's ability to control his/her own behavior was not extremely diminished; therefore, the accused is found to have the full capacity for liability; consequently, the finding of the judgment in first instance that the accused was in a state of diminished capacity due to serious kleptomania is unreasonable in light of logical law and the rules of thumb. Based on this determination, the court of prior instance quashed the judgment in first instance on the grounds of an erroneous finding of facts, and found that the accused had the full capacity for liability without conducting examination of facts by itself and sentenced the accused to imprisonment for 10 months.

3. However, regarding the judgment in first instance that determined that the accused was in a state of diminished capacity as there remains the reasonable suspicion that the accused's ability to control his/her own behavior has been extremely diminished, the judgment in prior instance thus determined that the finding of the judgment in first instance is unreasonable in light of logical law and the rules of thumb and quashed the judgment in first instance on the grounds of an erroneous finding of facts. The court of prior instance also immediately found that the accused had the full capacity for liability based only on the case records and evidence examined by the court of first instance without conducting examination of facts by itself, and made its own decision. The judgment in prior instance should thus be considered to be in violation of the proviso to Article 400 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see 1951 (A) No. 2436, the judgment of the Grand Bench of the Supreme Court of July 18, 1956, Keishu Vol. 10, No. 7, at 1147; 1953 (A) No. 2891, the judgment of the Second Petty Bench of the Supreme Court of December 14, 1956, Keishu Vo. 10, No. 12, at 1655; 1955 (A) No. 2244, the judgment of the Second Petty Bench of the Supreme Court of June 21, 1957, Keishu Vol. 11, No. 6, at 1721; 1966 (A) No. 1172, the judgment of the First Petty Bench of the Supreme Court of December 22, 1966, Keishu Vol. 20, No. 10, at 1233). This illegality has clearly influenced the judgment, and it is found that it would be clearly contrary to justice if the judgment in prior instance were not quashed.

Accordingly, in accordance with Article 411, item (i) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court quashes the judgment in prior instance, and in accordance with the main clause of Article 413 of the same Code, the Court remands this case to the Tokyo High Court. The Court unanimously decides as set forth in the main text of the judgment.

Public Prosecutor, HIRAMITSU Nobutaka, attended the trial.

Presiding Judge

Justice NAGAMINE Yasumasa

Justice TOKURA Saburo

Justice UGA Katsuya

Justice HAYASHI Michiharu

(This translation is provisional and subject to revision.)