1986.06.11

1981 (O) 609

Judgment upon case of constitutionality of the advance injunctions against publication of a magazine in relation to the freedom of expression

Judgment of the Grand Bench, dismissed

The appeal shall be dismissed.
The costs of the appeal shall be borne by the Appellant.

1. Concerning item (4) of the Appellant's first contention on Jokoku Appeal
Because the former part of paragraph 2, Article 21 of the Constitution stipulates absolute prohibition of censorship (ref. Grand Bench judgment upon the case (Gyo Tsu) No. 156 of 1982, decided on November 12, 1984, Minshu vol. 38, No. 12, p.1308), the Appellant's argument concerning this point is adjudicated prior to other arguments. As the aforementioned Grand Bench decision declares, "censorship" as provided in the former part of paragraph 2, Article 21 of the Constitution should be interpreted to indicate what has a special quality of prohibition of publication of matters being deemed objectionable by the administrative authorities as the main organ, based on a comprehensive and general examination of the contents of specific matters of expression prior to publication, such as the substance of thought conducted for the purpose of prohibiting publication in whole or in part. Now, prior restraint of printing, bookbinding, selling, distribution, etc. of a magazine or any other publication containing certain articles by an injunction, not necessarily based on the result of oral proceedings or examination of the respondent, allowing prima facie evidence as the means of proof, can be ordered through such informal proceeding though conducted in a form of trial. This regulates the relative rights in dispute as a so-called "provisional disposition settling the state of legal affairs". So it cannot be said to not have the same character as Cases on Noncontentious Matters. However, it should be said that prior restraint by an injunction does not constitute censorship, because it is ordered after a court of judicature ascertains the existence of the right alleged to be preserved such as claim for injunction and the necessity of preservative measures based on the petition by the concerned party with regard to the individual private dispute. This is unlike cases where prior restraint is conducted by administrative authorities with the objective of prior restraint itself after a comprehensive and general examination of the substance of the matters of expression. Accordingly, the decision of the court below which held that the issuance of the injunction by the Sapporo District Court based on the petition by the Appellee Q (hereinafter referred to as "the injunction in this case" ) against the publication of the April 1979 issue of "P", a monthly magazine published by the Appellant, which printed an article entitled "An Authoritarian's Temptation" (hereinafter referred to as "the article in this case") does not amount to censorship , is justifiable and the Appellant's argument cannot be accepted.

2. Other grounds of Jokoku Appeal
(1) The Appellant argues that even if the injunction in this case does not amount to "censorship", it violates the provision of paragraph 1, Article 21 of the Constitution which guarantees freedom of expressions. This point is adjudicated as follows.
a. Considering the existence of the substantive claim for injunctive relief prior to the examination on the constitutionality of the prior restraint in consideration of the Appellant's argument, it should be construed that a person whose reputation, objective appreciation he receives from society concerning his personal worth such as his character, virtue, reputation, trustworthiness, etc., has been illegally injured may seek not only claim for damage (Article 710, Civil Code) or an order requiring the defamer to take suitable measures for the restoration of the injured reputation (Article 723, same law), but also an injunction for the purpose of removing existing defamatory act or preventing defamation that should occur in the future. Because reputation is a very important legal interest under the protection of the law as with life and body, it would be said that a right to reputation as a right of the person is exclusionary in the same way as a real right.
b. However, in the case where the act of expression such as speech, publication, etc., causes defamation, reconciliation of the conflicting interests, that is, the protection of individual reputation as the personal right (Article 13, Constitution) and the guarantee of freedom of expression (Article 21 of the same) is necessary; therefore judicious consideration is required in light of the Constitution to distinguish when restrictive measures against an injurious act are permissible.
In a democratic nation where sovereign power resides with the people the following is the foundation of its existence. That is, the people as constituents of that nation may express any doctrine, advocacy of doctrine and the like as well as receive such information from each other, and by taking whatever he believes rightful from among them of his own free will, majority opinion is formed, and government administration is determined through such process. Therefore, the freedom of expression, especially the freedom of expression relating to public matters, must be respected as a particularly important constitutional right in a democratic nation. It is considered that this thought lies at the root of the paragraph 1, Article 21 of the Constitution. Of course, this provision does not provide unlimited guarantee of freedom of expression in all respects. As an expression which injures the reputation of another person is an abuse of freedom of expression, this may be restricted. However, in considering the above thought, it should be construed that when an act constituting civil and criminal defamation is found to relate to matters of public interest, and to have been done solely for the benefit of the public, and when the truth of the alleged facts is proved, the expression is not illegal. Even if the truth is not proved, when there is good reason for the perpetrator of the act to have mistakenly believed that the article was true, the foregoing act should be construed to be not malicious or negligent. By this, reconciliation between protection of individual reputation as a right of the person and guarantee of freedom of expression is established as a precedent of this court. (ref. Grand Bench judgment upon the case (A) No.2472 of 1966, decided on June 25, 1969, Keishu vol. 23, No. 7, p. 975 and First Petty Bench judgment upon the case (O) No.815 of 1962, decided on June 23, 1966, Minshu vol. 20, No. 5, p. 1118). This must be said to require consideration in examining whether prior restraint of the injurious act is permissible or not.
c. Next, whether the injunction conducted by a court against distribution, etc. of a publication constitutes so-called prior restraint, and thus violating the provision of paragraph 1, Article 21 of the Constitution will be examined.
(a) Prior restraint in acts of expression, hindering the matters of expression, such as publication of newspapers, magazines and other publications and broadcasts, etc. from reaching free society, shutting the door on communication of its contents to readers or viewers, or delaying the communication and thus destroying its significance has the effect of reducing the opportunities for public criticism. Moreover, due to characteristics of prior control being such that it can not be but presupposed, it easily becomes more far-reaching than after-the-fact sanctions, and in addition to the possibility of its abuse, it is considered to have a more deterrent effect, in reality, than after-the-fact sanctions. Therefore, it should be said that in light of the purport of Article 21 of the Constitution which guarantees the freedom of expression and prohibits censorship, prior restraint on acts of expression is allowed only under strict and definite requirements.
Injunction against distribution and other processes of publication corresponds to the above-mentioned prior restraint. Particularly when the objective is relative to the evaluation or criticism of public servants or candidates for public office, from that in itself it may be generally said to relate to matters of public interest. It must be said an injunction against the relevant act of expression should not be granted as a general rule in light of the aforesaid purport of the paragraph 2, Article 21 of the Constitution (ref. the above b), and considering that under the Constitution such expressions having social values superior to a private right of reputation should be specially protected. However, even in such a case as above, it must be said that an injunction should be exceptionally allowed only when it is obvious that the contents of expression are not true or its objectives are not solely in the public interest, and, moreover, when the victim may suffer serious and irreparable damage. Because when the foregoing substantial requirements are satisfied, and additionally it is obvious that the value of the relevant act of expression is inferior to the reputation of the victim, and the need for an injunction is affirmed as an effective, appropriate and necessary remedy. We hold this construction is not contrary to the above- mentioned purport of the Constitution.
(b) According to the explanations given above relative to the prior restraint on acts of expression, when prior restraint on acts of expression concerning matters relative to public interest is sought through procedure for a provisional disposition in general where only swift disposition is the main objective, examinations or inquiry of the respondent is not necessary and such prima facie evidence is adequate concerning proof, the procedural guarantee for the securing of freedom of expression cannot be said to be adequate. Moreover, in this instance, the means of cardinal defense on the side of the perpetrators of acts of expression are to prove that its objective is solely to promote the public interest and the relevant facts is factual (ref. above section b ). Therefore, it is proper to construe as a general rule that an opportunity should be given to argue and prove the factuality of the contents of the expression, etc., by conducting oral arguments or by examining the respondent when the court issues a provisional disposition order that orders prior restraint. However, even in the case an injunction against acts of expression concerning matters of public interest is sought, we hold that the issuance of injunction without conducting oral proceedings or examinations of the respondent is not contrary to the above-mentioned purport of Article 21 of the Constitution, when it is obviously found by materials presented by the petitioner that the contents of the expression is not true, that the objective of the expression is not to promote solely the public interest, and, moreover, when fear exists that the petitioner may suffer serious and irreparable damage. Because, when the above requirements are satisfied, we hold that the issuance of an injunction without giving an opportunity to the respondent for allegation and proof will cause no actual harm, and it may be said that the respondent has a expeditious relief measure based on the construction that the respondent can not only raise an objection but also seek suspension of the execution of "the provisional dispositions settling the state of affairs" (ref. First Petty Bench judgment upon the case (Ma) No.8 of 1948, decided on March 3, 1948, Minshu vol. 2, NO. 3, p. 65 and the Grand Bench judgment upon the case (Ku) No.43 of 1950, decided on September 25, 1950, Minshu vol. 4, No. 9, p. 435).

(2) Examining the facts of the case from the above-mentioned points of view,
a. The summary of the facts as found by the court below is as follows.
(a) The Appellee Q, Mayor of Asahikawa-City from May 1963 to September 1974, ran for office in the Hokkaido gubernatorial election of April 1975, and further decided in February 1979 to run in the election for the same office to be held in April of 1979.
(b) The Appellant's representative prepared the article in this case, and the Appellant decided to print the article in the instant magazine's April 1979 issue. The expected circulation of the first issue was twenty-five thousand. Publication was to be on or about February 23, 1979. Completing proofreading on February 8 of that year, preparations were being made for printing. The article in this case stated that the Governor of Hokkaido must be a person of sagacity and have a strong sense of responsibility with a clean and well-rounded character, and developed the point of argument that the Appellee Q did not possess the above qualification requirements, commenting on the character of the said Appellee by using such expressions as "skillful at lying, bluffing and cheating" during boyhood: "cockroaches such as Q (omitted)";" a magician with words and a street vendor quack (political)"; " a born liar"; "an ugly character hiding behind a beautiful mask"; "an opportunist without scruples, doing anything for his own interest and his own success"; "a mayor like the rump of the bitch"; "Kozo's true face is a confident man deceiving people by day and a bandit riding in the darkness by night, he is, in a word, a viperous Dosan". Concerning his private life it described "he divorced his innocent wife by dastardly means and caused her to commit suicide in order to win a new woman (omitted) who had been a hostess of a club (omitted)", and "had driven away his elder brothers born of a different mother taking advantage of the favoritism of his old father and his young mother". The article included description of his way of life as "always concerned with self- preservation, conscious of elections, promoted extreme plans at random, strengthened efforts for self-advertisement rather than to serve the public, excels in hunting for grafts, fattens his own pockets by uniting with certain businessmen and spreads corruption"; "skillfully eludes the law and eludes arrest", run for gubernatorial election "in order to become the Governor and exercise power at will". The article stressed that the said Appellee is "a useless and pernicious person to Hokkaido", and "the Japan Socialist Party should change the candidate for governorship immediately if reform is earnestly sought". The following sentences were to be appended to the title ahead of the text, "A goblin named Kozo is now wriggling on the earth of Hokkaido. It turns into a butterfly by day and a hairy caterpillar by night crying that (he) wants to live in the red brick (prefectural office) building. It's poisonous character bewilders the people. Now is the time to unmask the goblin ...... ".
(c) Mr. Fumio Suganuma and other attorneys for the Appellee Q, filed the petition in the Sapporo District Court on February 16, 1979 with the Appellee as the petitioner and the Appellant and R Printing Inc.. as the respondent for reasons of preventing injury to the Appelee's right to reputation, seeking a ruling of provisional disposition identical to the contents of the list of text of judgment as attached to the judgment paper of the court of the first instance which orders custody of the instant magazine by the court executor, and the prohibition of printing, bookbinding, selling or distribution, etc. of the instant magazine. A judge of the Sapporo District Court found the petition reasonable and rendered a judgment of provisional disposition same as the said list of text of judgment on the same day the petition was filed. Later, the court executor of the Sapporo District Court executed the judgment.
b. Analyzing the above facts, we first recognize that the article in this case relates to the public matter of criticism of Appellee Q who was going to run again for the Hokkaido gubernatorial election, and comes under the type against which an injunction should not be allowed as a general rule. However, it can not be found at all that in light of the above-mentioned contents of the article in this case and the method of description as mentioned above the article containing considerable personal attack on the said Appellee by extremely vulgar and insulting remarks was written solely for promoting the public interest, and it should be said that lack of credibility of the article was obvious even at the time of the issuance of the injunction in this case judging from the contents of expression of the article and evidence which could be examined immediately. This issue of magazine, having an expected first issue circulation of twenty-five thousand, was considered to be capable of seriously and almost irreparably defaming the said Appellee, a prospective candidate in the Hokkaido gubernatorial election scheduled less than two months after the date of publication. Therefore, we hold that the issuance of the injunction in this case against printing, bookbinding and selling or distribution of the instant magazine should be said to satisfy not only the constitutional requirements in the substantial aspect concerning the existence of claim for injunctive relief (ref. the above (1) c (a)), but also fulfilled the constitutional procedural requirements in the procedural aspect although the holding of oral proceedings or examination of the respondent were not found by the court below (ref. the above (1) c (b)). Accordingly, the issuance of the injunction in this case is not unconstitutional as is contended and the assertion of unconstitutionality or illegality of the filing of the injunction in this case which is based on the above contention lacks a basis.

(3) Further, the argument is that the court below did not conduct a hearing as to whether or not the contents of the article in this case constituted defamation, but also approved the injunction in this case which prohibited the distribution of the instant magazine on the basis of materials obtained illegally by the Appellee Q and others, and the illegal acquisition of the above materials violated the latter part of paragraph 2, Article 21 of the Constitution which provides for inviolability of secrecy of any means of communication.
However, according to the record, the court below, after conducting examination of fact, is acknowledged to have made a finding of fact that the contents of the article in this case clearly constituted defamation, and concerning the point of illegal acquisition of materials by Appellee Q and others the finding of the court below did not recognize the fact.
Appellant's argument may only be said to be nothing but reproach to the decision of the court below relying on facts not found by the court.

(4) Accordingly, the decision of the court below containing the same foregoing purport may be found to be proper, and the Appellant's argument against the process of unconstitutionality and illegality should be said to not exist.
Therefore, the Court by unanimous opinion of the Justices on the bench, aside from the supplementary opinion of the Justice Masami Ito, Justice Susumu Ohashi, Justice Keiji Maki, Justice Atsushi Nagashima, and the opinion of Justice Masataka Taniguchi, renders the judgment as set forth in the main text in accordance with Articles 89, 95, 384, and 396 of the Law of Civil Procedure.

The supplementary opinion of Justice Masami Ito is as follows :

I do not have any objection to the conclusion and reasoning stated in the majority opinion, and agree to them both.
The instant case presents an important issue on the Constitution with respect to prior restraint against acts of expression by court, so I will state my opinion mainly on the substantial aspect of the above issue concerning whether or not prior restraint by court is prohibited by the Constitution, and may it be constitutionally allowable how to establish a standard of determination for permissibility, thereby supplementing the majority opinion.
1. As stated in the majority opinion this Court constructing that censorship as provided in paragraph 2, Article 21 of the Constitution should be construed to indicate that it has, as a special quality, the prohibition of what are deemed inappropriate, after the administrative authorities as the main organ, for the purpose of prohibition of publication as a whole or a part, covering the matters of expression of substance of thought, etc., conduct the comprehensive and general examination of the above specific matters of expression prior to its publication, and adjudged it should be absolutely prohibited as confining censorship to be the one which has been historically considered the typical censorship. (see the Grand Bench judgment upon the case (Gyo Tsu) No. 156 of 1982, decided on December 12, 1984, Minshu vol. 38, No. 12, p. 1308). Although this opinion interprets narrowly the meaning of censorship as stipulated in the Constitution, it may be said as an appropriate opinion, because it forms two facets of the strict interpretation which admits of no exception to the prohibition of censorship under the Constitution nor room for being permitted constitutionally as far as it amounts to "censorship".
However, the said adjudication regards that all that are considered as the prior restraint on the act of expression by governmental power cannot be construed as constitutionally prohibited by reason that it corresponds to "censorship", and, taking into consideration the prior restraint on the act of expression has generally an extremely great possibility to infringe upon freedom of expression, it is needless to say that the absolute prohibition of "censorship" as provided in the Constitution contains the purport that the prior restraint in general is evaluated negatively under the Constitution. Thus, this purport should be essentially applied to the interpretation of the paragraph 1, Article 21 of the Constitution which guarantees freedom of expression. As a matter of course, this is the issue of constitutional regulation under the above paragraph and is not the one like the absolute prohibition under the provision of the former part of paragraph 2 of the said Article, and, therefore the prior restraint itself is not instantly branded as unconstitutional, but strict requisites should be sought for setting a standard to decide whether it is allowed or not.
In the first place, in consideration of the constitutionality of the restraint on freedom of expression, the strict standard is applied unlike in the case of other human rights, particularly rights relating to economics (see Grand Bench judgment upon the case (A) No. 23 of 1970, decided on November 22, 1972, Keishu, VOl. 26, No. 9, p. 576 ;Grand Bench judgment upon the case (Gyo Tsu) No. 120 of 1968, decided on April 30, 1975, Minshu vol. 29, No. 4, p. 572). Especially in the case of prior restraint, i.e. among those restricting freedom of expression, it is considered that the standard of constitutionality must be more stricter than in after-the-fact sanction. This Court has already decided that consideration is necessary so that freedom of expression might not be unjustly restricted by the regulation of law, and that "it should be said that this is especially so concerning matter of prior restraint and the like" (See the above-cited Grand Bench judgment decided on December 12, 1984).
Though this is discussed in relation to the definiteness of the provision of law regulating freedom of expression, this idea may apply to the regulation of freedom of expression in general. Naturally, there are many varieties of prior restraint, therefore it is difficult to set the standard by which to judge them uniformly, and moreover the uniform standard cannot be said appropriate. I think that in this case it would be useful to measure the extent of difference and similarity between the quality and function of "censorship" as stated above and those of the prior restraint concerned.
2. The subject of discussion in the instant case is the advance prohibition against the act of expression by injunction procedure by a court. Obviously this does not amount to "censorship" as mentioned above, because it is not conducted by administrative authorities but by court of judicature. Therefore, it cannot be said to correspond to what is necessarily prohibited under the Constitution. But it is too hasty to regard the injunction as far from "censorship" immediately from the fact that a court is an organ to conduct regulation. Thus, the consideration of the substance is required in examining the matters in question. The outstanding characteristics of "censorship" can be seen in the fact that generally and comprehensively it takes a certain expression within the framework of prior restraint and disposed of in its procedure in secret generally, not revealing the grounds of the disposition as a rule, hence there being no, or extremely scare, means to contend the disposition legally. As shown in the majority opinion, the injunction by court does not conduct comprehensive and general examination, and is heard and judged in judicial procedure based upon the application by the party concerned, and is issued indicating grounds and, further, the way to contend it in legal procedure is admitted. Accordingly, it should be stated that it is different from "censorship" not only in point of the organ in charge but also of its substance.
Nevertheless, on the other hand, it is not be denied that the advance prohibition by the injunction by court has aspects similar to "censorship". Firstly, it has qualities common to "censorship" in that it restrains the act of expression by public authorities before they reach the recipients, and accordingly the restrained expression is deprived of the opportunity to appear in the free market of thoughts where any kind of expression is taken out without limit and an expression is supposed to have its own equals, except for the case of republication of the matters with the same content of expression. Secondly, the examination by court covers not only the external points of expression but the content of thought itself as well. Thus, on such points it has a factor more similar to "censorship" in comparison to the inspection of imports by the customs with which this court has judged matters of expression "as merely what is to be inspected to the possible extent where determination can be readily made.". Thirdly, an attention should be paid to the following points: the procedure of injunction to determine the temporary status, although a judicial procedure, has in it a non-contentious factor and a character similar to the administrative procedure in a sense, hence the procedure of summary nature, and further it may occur that a disadvantageous debtor is not given an opportunity to get his or her opinion heard.
3. In this consideration, it may be stated that the advance prohibition against the act of expression by the injunction of court does not amount to "censorship" as absolutely prohibited by the Constitution but is the prior restraint in some aspects similar to it; and the requisite for the right of the advance prohibition claim, which can afford a temporary satisfaction by such an injunction, should be decided with a considerably strict standard in accordance with the purport of the Constitution. The majority opinion may be considered to be based on the idea as mentioned above. I wish to further analyse the standard as follows.
(1) The first idea is a way to decide by comparison of values. It goes without saying that comparison of values should be made in deciding the constitutionality of restraint on the human rights in general, because the adjustment between the right and the conflicting interests comes into question. (In the instance where the legislator of the Constitution is considered to have already made comparison of values at the time of the enactment and codified its conclusion, like the case of prohibition of "censorship", then in such a case whether a given regulation corresponds to censorship may be an issue, but it should be absolutely prohibited as long as it does so and the comparison of values in the process of interpretation and application is not to be allowed any more. But this is a very exceptional case.) When the right of honor as a right of the person conflicts with the right of freedom of expression like the case at hand, the adjustment by the comparison of values should be required even in taking the stand to insist on the superiority of the freedom of spirit. In this sense, that comparison of values should be made in the process of decision is not inadequate in itself. But if comparison of value is made in every instance by taking into consideration the circumstances thereof, it will rather be a decision lacking in standard and there will be a possibility that it is put under the determiner's arbitrariness in concluding whichever interest may take priority and a shrinking effect against it is considerably great in the case of freedom of expression. Thus, apart from the case where the decision with reasonability standard is allowed, in the case concerning the right of spiritual freedom, the decision only based upon the comparison of values according to each case is, in my consideration, not sufficient and the standard to be an index to the comparison should be established.
Although there are many varieties of the act of expression, the conception to classify them into types and to compare the value in each type is considered as a useful one, because it gives a settled rule to the comparison and makes clear the case in which regulation is allowed, in considering the comparison made according to the individual case as aforesaid. It is one example thereof that in the instance of defamation like the present one, if it comes under the type of criticism against a public person, that the decision is to be made by attaching an importance to the public interest of the expression, considering the social status of the object to be asserted as a victim. The decision which can be objective to a considerable extent concerning the conciliation between the freedom of expression and the right to honor will be attained in this way. The supplementary opinion of Justice Ohashi supports this idea and is full of suggestions. If the comparison of values attaching importance to the above-stated type is applied, it may bring about the same conclusion as the majority opinion in the instant case, and moreover the majority opinion will be on the standpoint basically common to this conception. In my opinion, aside from the case like the instant one, if the decision should be made generally by the classified comparison of values, there may arise the complicated problems how to classify the type of expression and what kind of standard for judgment should be adopted for each type, and if the standard becomes rigorous, a proper decision may not be attained. Above all, although the comparison of values classified by a type is appropriate in deciding the constitutionality of after-the-fact sanction against the act of expression, it seems that in the case of prior restraint emphasis should be laid on the very fact that it is not an after-the-fact but "prior" restraint. It is useful to consider the type of expression, but this would rather extenuate the consideration of its being a prior restraint.
(2) Next, what is to be kept in view is the "actual malice" standard shown in the opinion of Justice Taniguchi. Since this is a theory to reinforce the guarantee of freedom of expression by paying attention to its important worth, I will pay my sincere respect for his idea. As clearly shown by the same Justice agreeing to the conclusion of the majority opinion, the conclusion is not changed in the instant case even though this opinion is adopted, and I dare say that it will reach the same conclusion from another point of view. But I myself have some doubts in using this as a standard for the judgment on prior restraint, even when it is confined to the case of defamation against a public person as the object. Although it is possible to presume an actual malice from the objective circumstances, it is not a few cases to be inappropriate as the standard used in the process requiring a speedy disposition like a provisional disposition as it has to do with the subjectivity of an actor of expression. Especially it may not be proper to employ this standard without hearing the opinion of the actor of expression. I intend to reserve for future occasion the examination of this standard as an index to judgment in considering after-the-fact sanctions concerning the defamation against a public person.
(3) The standard adopted by the majority opinion is a decision that in principle even a court may not regulate the act of expression in advance when it concerns the evaluation, criticism, etc. of candidates for election for public office and public servants, by taking into consideration the purport of the provision of Article 230-2 of the Penal Code which is the substantial statute to attempt the adjustment between freedom of expression and right to honor; that it determines to permit the prior restraint exceptionally only when it is obvious that the contents of expression are not true or its objectives were not solely in the public interest, and only when the victim may suffer serious and almost irreparable damage after-the-fact. In this way there cannot be said to cause bad effects incident to prior restraint, even when court permits the advance prohibition in the aforesaid case where the content of expression is judged to be lacking in truth evidently, not to be made for the public purpose and to possibly give almost irreparable and serious damages to right to honor. Rather, such an act of expression should naturally be regarded inferior to right to honor in value, and it is not considered to be against the Constitution if such an expression is not made to appear by justice in the free market. As long as the notable definiteness is required, it will be, in my view, impossible to say that this standard restrains the act of expression by uncertain factors and cannot be a safeguard for the freedom of expression as Justice Taniguchi states.
4. If the strict standard as stated above is to be applied, the case will be remarkably limited in which the advance prohibition on the act of expression is permitted by injunction which confines the way of proof to prima facie evidence. In my view, it will not be possible to prohibit in advance by injunction the defamation against a public person, especially a candidate for election for public offices, and against a public servant particularly to be chosen by election or having a power to exert influence on the way of politics and administration, apart from the unusual and exceptional case like the present one. I do not deny that the right to honor is an important human right and the advance prohibition is necessary and effective in order to really protect honor on the ground that once an defamatory act of expression is made public honor will be violated instantly. However, at least in the case where a public person is the object, even when the victim can get remedy as attaching importance to the value of freedom of expression, there may be no alternative but to be made through after-the-fact sanction aside from extremely limited exceptions. In addition, as is pointed out in the supplementary opinion of Justice Ohashi, the damages for defamation in our country is subject to the criticism that it is sometimes of too small amount nominally even if it is admitted, and the reflection of the person concerned is urged. In my further consideration, there is a need to design a more effective and appropriate method than the one approved at present as after-the-fact remedy, but it is a problem different from the admissibility of the prior restraint by injunction like the case at hand.
The supplementary opinion of Justice Susumu Ohashi is as follows:
1. I agree with the court opinion as to the standard for judging whether to grant a substantial claim for injunctive relief against an act of expression as well and I would like to add my opinion about its reason.
It sometimes cannot be avoided that freedom of speech protected by paragraph 1, Article 21 of the Constitution and the individual's reputation protected by Article 13 conflict with each other. However, it furnishes a basis indispensable to democratic society where the affairs of state are administered under the public opinion formed through free discussion that freedom to express each opinion and to participate in forming the public opinion is guaranteed. The provision of paragraph 1, Article 21 of the Constitution retains this function to guarantee the freedom to participate in forming public opinion by an act of expression. In order this function to be fulfiled, it is necessary that, concerning matters relative to public interest, for people who want to do an act of expression is guaranteed the freedom of making public a fact of which they want to inform and an opinion which they want to give and that, for people who are to receive an act of expression should be afforded an opportunity to have free access to information that they like to have. And, as the court opinion says, it does not amount to censorship that a court, determining whether one has a claim to place an act of expression under ban on the basis of a right to reputation as a right of the person, orders to put the ban before the commission of the act, not only at a trial on the merits but also as a preventive injunction. However, the purport of the former part of paragraph 1, Article 21 of the Constitution which prohibited censorship should be fully considered in relation to the freedom of expression as well and prior restraint should be said to involve a very serious question to place a prior ban since it suspends publicizing what is to be expressed before readers and/or listeners are able to come in contact with it. Therefore, protection of the freedom of expression should take precedence of protection of the individual's reputation when the act of expression concerning matters relative to public interest even if it defames an individual and the prior restraint should be granted only when more severe substantial and procedural requirements than to impose a subsequent sanction are met. From this point of view, I would consider under what conditions we can grant a preventive injunction. It is basically a question of where we would find harmony and balance between the protection of individual's reputation as a right of the person and the guarantee of the freedom of expression, and should be judged by balancing value of the individuals' reputation damaged by the act of expression in question and value held by it and by deciding which should have priority. In doing so, we could think of various circumstances as elements which should be taken into account, such as public character of the person that was criticized in the act of expression or the incident, public interests and truthfulness of the content of the expression, intention of the actor, extent to which the reputation has been damaged, type and character of the mass media and so forth. And it seems possible to reach a very just conclusion by striking a balance among these various factors examined minutely in each individual case. However, in a preventive injunction case, such factors before the fact are often indeterminate and, if those various circumstances are to be considered, proceedings to its final determination will be complicated and, because of this, the decision-making could be a difficult One. In addition, a preventive injunction, the effect of which is direct and attractive to the victim, is subject to abuse and it has great adverse influence upon the perpetrator of expression. If we compare and balance these various circumstances individually and concretely in each case, standard of judgment would be unclear, it could be hard to make reliable prediction and that might result in unnecessary self-control on the side of the perpetrator of expression. Considering that a preventive injunction has such serious problems as mentioned above, I cannot agree with the opinion that makes determination by examining various circumstances individually and concretely in comparing and balancing them. In order to avoid these difficulties caused by this individual balancing, it would be proper to resort to categorized balancing, that is, to make determination by comparing and balancing the generalized interest of the act of expression which is categorized as much as possible and the generalized interest of the reputation which is conflicting with it. Categorized balancing might not result in balancing and comparing which is close to and most appropriate to each individual situation like in individual balancing. However, I think the objectiveness and the steadiness of the judgment should be selected.
According to the court opinion, in the case of the acts of expression concerning matters of public interest, a preventive injunction, as a rule, should not be granted, however, when it is obviously found that the contents of expression is not true, that the objectives of the expression is not to promote solely the public interest, and, moreover, when fear exists that the victim may suffer serious and irreparable damage an injunction is exceptionally sought.
2. Next, I would like to add my opinion concerning procedural aspects the court opinion refers to
Taking this point of view, the court opinion says provisional disposition ordering prior restraint should be granted, as a rule, after a hearing is held or after the obligor is questioned in spite of the provisions of the statute (Article 756 and paragraph 1, Article 741 of the Code of Civil Procedure). However, it also says that it does not violate the purport of the Constitution that the court issues the preventive injunction without questioning the obligor when it is obviously found by materials presented by the petitioner that the contents of expression is not true, the objectives of the expression is not to promote solely the public interest, and, moreover, when fear exists that the petitioner may suffer serious and irreparable damage.
It goes without saying that the phrase, "by materials presented by the petitioner", does mean they do not include by materials presented by the obligor and that it does not mean they exclude facts known to public nor facts obvious to the court. Although in this case, it was the article printed in the April, 1979, issue of the P that was the object of the injunction, from the record in this case, it can be inferred that the preliminary injunctions prohibiting from distributing and selling the articles about candidates for public office including the Appellee were issued several times by the Sapporo District Court before the case at issue. Especially, as for the preliminary injunction prohibiting from distributing and selling the November, 1978, issue of that journal, the Appellant was given the opportunity to bring forth a counter argument in writing well in advance (That means the obligor was questioned by the most considerate means). Considering the content of this act of expression materials presented and those facts obvious to the court which issued the preliminary injunction, even if a provisional disposition ordering prior restraint was issued without questioning the obligor (This is what the court below did not confirm.), it must be said to be obvious that the preliminary injunction in question does not violate a constitutional requirement.
3. As stated above, I fully agree with the court opinion (as to this point, Justice Taniguchi does, too) that maintains a severe attitude toward prior restraints. On the other hand, it should be strongly pointed out that it would be unfair if the people whose reputation, "a very important legally protected interest along with one's life and body", has been damaged cannot enjoy sufficient protection, even if it is a subsequent one. Here in this country, the fact is that the compensation for damages to one's harmed reputation is often criticized to be nominal even where it is allowed and that, as a result, speech which in itself should fall outside the protection of freedom of speech becomes widespread. This is the point that deserves the earnest consideration of the persons concerned. Justice Keiji Maki agrees with the supplementary opinion of Justice Susumu Ohashi.
The supplementary opinion of Justice Atsushi Nagashima is as follows:
I would like to add my opinion about how the provision of Article 230-2 of the Penal Code pertaining to the so-called proving fact (Jijitsu Shomei), that relieves one from criminal responsibility, relates to the question whether one is liable for damaging the reputation under the Civil Code and, in its turn, the question whether preliminary preventive injunctions against damaging the reputation should be granted.
1. (1) Two cases which the court opinion cites pertaining to this point are adjudged as follows. The first petty bench decision of the Supreme Court decided on June 23, 1966 says, "It is proper to say that one does not owe tort liability for defamation under the Civil Code because of lack of illegality where the act relates to the matters of public concern and where one did the act solely to promote public interest and when the alleged fact is proved to be true. Even if this fact is not proved to be true, it is proper to say that one does not owe tort liability after all because of the absence of mens rea or negligence when there is good reason for the perpetrator of the act to believe it to be true (This could be certainly inferred from the purport of the provision of the Article 230-2 of the Penal Code.)". The Grand Bench decision decided on June 25, 1969 says, concerning the crime of defamation under the Penal Code, "It should be observed, however, that Article 230-2 of the Penal Code has been stipulated to reconcile the protection of the honour of an individual as a right of the person and the guarantee concerning legitimate speech provided for in Article 21 of the Constitution. Giving thought to the reconciliation and balance of these two interests, it should be construed that, even if there is no proof of the existence of the facts under paragraph 1 of Article 230-2 of the Penal Code, no crime of defamation was committed because of the absence of mens rea, when the perpetrator of act mistakenly believes in the existence of the facts and there was good reason for his mistaken belief on the basis of reliable information and grounds. Putting these two judgments together, it may be construed that Article 230-2 of the Penal Code is intended to promote reconciliation between the protection of the individual's honour as a right of the person and the guarantee concerning legitimate speech under Article 21 of the Constitution, and, in its interpretation, reconciliation and balance between the two constitutional rights should be taken into consideration, and that the purport of the provision of Article 230-2 of the Penal Code being interpreted on the basis of such a consideration may be construed to have made clear that it is appropriate for determination as to whether a civil defamation as an unlawful act is constituted, including the point that the tort liability is relieved when there is good reason for his mistaken belief. I will call the standard by which we decide whether one should bear the tort responsibility for defaming another the theory of reasonableness (Sotosei-no Riron).
(2) By the way, a crime of insult (Article 231 of the Penal Code) as well as a crime of defamation (Article 230, the same law) is prescribed in "crimes against reputation" of the Penal Code and the provision of Article 230-2 is provided for relieving the responsibility of the defamation. On the other hand, one bears the tort liability for defaming another when the reputation as a right of the person has been illegally damaged and that has no direct relevance to the question of whether the act of violation in question constitutes a crime of defamation or a crime of insult under the Penal Code.
An element which distinguishes the two is generally construed to be the existence of allegation of facts, since both are prescribed under the same chapter on "crimes against reputation" and the same requirement of publicity is imposed upon both. And the protected interests in both cases are the reputation which is an objective estimation of a person by society. Indeed, there could be cases in which the victim's sense of honour is the main legally protected interest such as when the victim has been cursed in public temporarily. But it goes without saying that the insulting expression recorded in documents, sound or visual tapes which could last at least for a while can harm another's objective reputation even without an allegation of concrete facts.
2. Thus, in the case of civil defamation it has been made clear that the question of whether objective reputation has been illegally damaged is important and that the fact that the act of expression, that is, the act of violation, accompanied by the allegation of facts is not a requirement. However, it does not deny that the act accompanied by allegation of facts could be excused based on the purport of the provision of Article 230-2 under the Penal Code. On the contrary, it does not prevent us from excusing the perpetrator on the theory of reasonableness when the act of expression which has harmed one's objective reputation without allegation of the facts could be seen as the legitimate (proper) one to have intended for the benefit of the public in relation to public interest that relates to the matters of public concern, that is solely intended to serve the public purpose. Discussing this point from another perspective, we usually permit an act of expression falling within the area of fair comments which are permitted as those concerning political problems or social problems with or without allegations of concrete facts even though the language and expression amount to a violent, bitter one, or sometimes even to a derisive or almost defamatory one. I think that fair comments in this sense could be built into the test of the theory of reasonableness as an element (Here, I assume the fact that there has been a reasonable ground to believe the truthfulness of the fact is, generally speaking, one of the requirements by which the act is permitted as fair comments. The more the comment deals with matters of the public nature or the matters of public concern, the more advantageous to the one who made the comment the judgment on the question of reasonableness will be and the heavier the burden to prove the non-existence of the reasonableness will be born by the other party.). However, the comments that cannot be permitted by the generally accepted idea in the society as contemptuous defamation such as the one of which content and expression have nothing to do in context with its subject matter and obviously has no relationship with matters of public concern or the one whose act of expression is mainly intended to insult, to slander, to contempt or to libel another and the allegation of facts, if any, is used not to allege the truthfulness of the fact but as a background information to make a personal attack are not included in the fair comments. Since they are not public comments and have nothing to do with the matters of public concern, it is natural that one is liable for the defamation even on the theory of reasonableness as well.
3. (1) The article at issue that was to be appeared in the magazine in question is thought to have been intended to maintain that the Appellee is not appropriate for Governor of Hokkaido by, on the one hand, criticizing the political stand or the policy of the political party that is thought to afford the main support of the Appellee Q and commenting that it is harmful for the future of Hokkaido, and, on the other hand, by making a personal attack employing specially vulgar and abusive terms on the Appellee's personality, personal history, private life, behavior and others. The comments upon the political problem in the former and the argument on the personality in the latter lack coherence and the repeated personal attack which has nothing to do with the comment on the political problem from the beginning to the end marks the latter. It goes without saying the fact that the most part of the article in the issue is devoted to comment, whether it is fair or not, on the political problem in volume does not keep us from holding one liable for defamation concerning the unnecessarily insulting and slanderous portion of the article which has nothing to do with the comment.
(2) By the way, the Appellee Q was to run for the Governor of Hokkaido when the magazine in question was to be published. Although he did not hold a position as a candidate for the public office, it was confidently expected that he would do so and it could be construed generally to have public concern that the personality, the personal history, the behavior and others of the person are reported extensively and subject to public estimation and criticism. However, the very part of the article in question which was confirmed and cited by the court below could be, together with the part, which was not cited there (I would hesitate to do so), that says, "His father was a bold businessman famous in Asahikawa who had once been a roadhorse man. He blindly loved a young beautiful prostitute in his old age and the masterpiece of the two was the Appellee", called a insulting defamation document in a classical sense that is insulting, abusive, and slanderous in itself and cannot be permitted by the generally accepted idea in the society. Therefore, it is clear in itself that the article is not intended to serve the public purpose. It is easy to see that the reputation, objective estimation formed by the society, of the Appellee who had been in the public office as mayor of Asahikawa City chosen by public election for more than ten years and had run for the Governor of Hokkaido once before, would have been seriously damaged.
4. The last point to be discussed is, on the basis of the provision of Article 230-2, Penal Code, how the theory of reasonableness that has been developed with the intention of striking a balance between the freedom of speech under the Constitution and the protection of reputation as a right of the person applies, together with the theory of the fair comment, to the provisional disposition seeking the injunction against violation of the right to reputation before the commission of the act.
I fully agree with the court opinion together with its reasoning that the court should be prudent in granting the preliminary injunction of distribution of published materials compared with the subsequent criminal sanction, damage recovery or restitution and that it should basically not be allowed to grant it especially when the expression has something to do with the matters of public concern because the freedom of expression containing social value that has preference to the individual's right to reputation should be specially protected under the Constitution.
It goes, however, without saying that the theory of reasonableness mentioned above could be the test to decide whether the one bears tort liability for defamation and, at the same time, the test to confirm that there exists the right to reputation itself. Here, where the reconciliation and the balance between the freedom of expression which should be specially protected under the Constitution when the act of expression has something to do with the matters of public concern and the opposing right to reputation are at issue, there must exist a special circumstance under which the right to reputation should be especially protected in order to keep the balance. Examining the test of public purpose and that of the truthfulness of the fact that becomes the standard for judgment according to the theory of reasonableness from those points of view, first, it should be decided that the act of expression in question clearly serves no public purpose and that the alleged facts are obviously untrue and, second, it should be the necessary requirements that the party seeking the preventive injunction can prove this obvious violation of the right to reputation. As for the preliminary injunction, the party seeking it need to prove this by its own proof. The court opinion that basically requires the court to give an opportunity to allege and to prove the truthfulness of what was expressed by opening a public hearing or by questioning the obligor seems to require a court to examine cautiously whether that obvious violation is proved except for exceptional cases where it has been proved by the evidence produced by the party seeking the injunction. We should mention the factor that the violation of the right to reputation is more serious than in normal cases and, at the same time, it will be very difficult to recover that serious damage subsequently but for the prior injunction as a special circumstance which is more important and more substantial. These two are the substantial requirements to grant a prior preventive injunction concerning an act of expression having something to do with public concern, while securing harmony and keeping balance between the freedom of expression required by the Constitution and the protection of the reputation as a right of the person. If some of these requirements are, in fact, the same as those to grant a preliminary preventive injunction, it does not mean that they cease to be the Constitutional requirements.
Looking at this case, we could conclude easily that what is expressed in the article in question is not true and, at the same time, that it serves no public purpose by the proofs produced by the obligee in the proceedings to issue a preliminary injunction, as the supplementary opinion of Justice Ohashi pointed out. Considering the special seriousness of the damage which would have been caused by its publication, I have no objection to the court opinion which says that the decision on the preliminary injunction in question is not unconstitutional nor illegal in the substantive aspects as well as in the procedural aspects. But I would add that it could be construed as follows: it is allowed to grant a preliminary preventive injunction without examining whether or not some of the things expressed therein is true even if the small part of the article could be taken to allege some facts in general terms, since the part of the article in question which is allegedly defamatory is in itself insulting defamation in a classical sense that cannot be permitted by any means by the generally accepted idea in the society.
The opinion of Justice Masataka Taniguchi is as follows:
1. Concerning the requirements of prior restraint on the magazine articles, etc. relative to public matters I have a rather different view from the majority opinion, therefore, I would like to state my opinion on this point.
(1) Paragraphs 2 and 1, Article 21 of the Constitution guarantee the free circulation of information which is necessary and useful for debating or decision-making on public matters, namely, the freedom of expressing opinion and transfer of information without interference by public authority. Because this guarantee of freedom, as the majority opinion states, is the fundamental element for vital administration of democracy, it is the right which [superior guarantee] should be secured by the Constitution compared to the protection of other rights established by the Constitution. As far as it conforms with the spirit and the purpose of this guarantee, freedom of expression has priority over protection of individual reputation as a right of the person.
Consequently, when the contents of the expression of magazine articles, etc. are on public matters concerning public servants or candidates for elective public offices, the protection of freedom to publish, debate and secure the circulation of information which is necessary and useful to decision- making has priority over protection of reputation of the public servants or the candidates for elective public offices, and it should be deemed to be justifiable to point out the facts which defame these persons, and such acts to publish those articles are not illegal and are absolved from civil or criminal liability for libel.
(2) Then, furthermore, when two rights, namely, the individual reputation as a right of the person and freedom of expression, conflict a question arises as to what extent it is necessary and useful to secure the circulation of information in order to secure the free debate and decision-making on public matters, especially to what extent it is necessary to permit the circulation of false information.
To my mind, in case where the circulation of false information defames someone and if, by the mere reason that the information is false, such acts are deemed to constitute libel and a responsible person will be charged with the civil and/or criminal liability for libel, then the general citizens will hesitate to express opinions or to offer informations considering and fearing the accusation of libel against them when the contents of the expression prove to be false. As a result, valuable protection of freedom of expression will result in the [self censorship], and freedom of speech faces the danger of freezing.
In order to prevent such [self censorship] and to enable debate and decision-making on public matters, it is necessary to permit false speech as well. As some scholars indicate, even if the contents of speech are false and statement of opinion is based on such false facts, presentation of the opinion and free debate will only compel reconsideration and re-examination of the dissenting opinion, and bring about deeper recognition of the reason to support such opinion and better understanding of the meaning of it. Judging from this point of view, we have to admit that wrong speech has some positive aspect of usefulness to free debate, and that, as to false speech, there is some necessity and usefulness to protect it and to guarantee freedom to permit the expression of it. To consider the requirement of prior restraint on magazine articles, etc. about public matters, we have to bear those points in mind in the first place. [The appropriate remedy for wrong speech is MORE SPEECH.]
(3) Now, I consider requirements of prior restraint.
the reason of superior guarantee of freedom of expression is as previously stated. Considering in view of the ground of the guarantee, it is hardly deniable that even freedom of expression has a certain limit. When the contents of expression are false, we also have to admit that there is no necessity and usefulness to protect all the speech of that kind. Especially when the contents of expression is false and they trespass and/or damage the other person's reputation as a right of the person, taking the protection of a right of the person into account, consideration on this point is required. I conclude that the limitation is fixed as follows. This is, prior restraint on expression requires special prudence compared to the after-the-fact restraint, and when the victim of defamation is a public person such as a public servant or candidate for elective public office, etc. and the contents of the expression are on public matters, we should not easily control the expression even if the fact expressed is false. However, I conclude that when the act of expression has been made with so-called "actual malice"-that is, the act has been performed with knowledge that the fact expressed was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not, the superior protection of freedom of expression is diminished and the protection will not be secured. Because in that situation one has expressed untruthful information knowingly or has been indifferent to the truthfulness of the contents of the expression, and considering the ground of Article 21 of the Constitution which guarantees the priority of freedom of expression, there is no need nor usefulness to protect such act of expression. The majority opinion concludes that when it is obvious that the expression is false or that the aim of the expression is not solely in the public interest, prior restraint on the magazine articles, etc. on public matters is allowed, but on this point I do not agree. To my mind, as majority opinion also admits, when the contents of the article are the valuation, criticism, etc. of public servants or candidates for elective public offices, they are deemed to be related to the public concern by these contents themselves and as to these kind of facts it is possible to conclude that law deems the aim of the expression to be in public interest (cf. paragraph 3, Article 230-2, Penal Code). Therefore, concerning such act of expression, I do not conclude that it will be the safeguard for the protection of freedom of expression to admit prior restraint on the magazine articles, etc. on public matters based on such indefinite requirement that the aim of expression is not solely in the public interest, as such requirement is not so clear as a standard.
2. Next, I consider requirements of prior restraint on the act of expression through the injunction procedure in court.
I agree with the majority opinion on this point that, considering the principle of Article 21 of the Constitution, procedural guarantee is not enough, if, for the purpose of quick conduct, as in the general procedure of provisional injunction, court does not necessitate oral proceeding or examination of the respondent and allow prima facie evidence as the means of proof and that to issue an injunction of prior restraint court should, as a rule, conduct examination of the respondent to hear his opinion or explanation and to give him opportunity to state and prove the truthfulness, etc. of the contents of expression, and that, however, when the object of restraint is the matter of public concern such as the evaluation or criticism, etc. of public servants or candidates for elective public offices, it is not against the purport of Article 21 of the Constitution even if court issues provisional disposition order of injunction against such object without oral hearing or examination of the respondent, provided that, without holding oral hearing or examination of the respondent, it is obviously found by the material presented by the petitioner that requirement of prior restraint is satisfied. However, concerning prior restraint on magazine articles, etc. on public matters, I conclude that it is the requirement that the individual has made the expression with actual malice to the fact that the contents of expression were false, so it is necessary to modify the majority opinion to some extent on issuing injunction of prior restraint on such kind of articles by court.
I conclude that court is naturally required, as shown in the majority opinion, to open oral proceedings or to hold hearing of the respondent and give him an opportunity to claim and prove when court issues a provisional disposition order that orders prior restraint in light of paragraphs 2 and 1, Article 21 of the Constitution, and on that occasion court must give the respondent to claim and prove that there existed proper and reasonable ground and/or data for him to presume the credibility of expressed facts, tentatively and that the act of expression has been done according to such ground and/or data. Because that is a necessary and indispensable requirement to permit the respondent to defend that he had no actual malice and to prevent the court in question from issuing provisional injunction. And the majority opinion states that, as to the requirement of prior restraint on act of expression in case of trespass and damage of fame, it is a substantive requirement that expression is capable of the serious and irreparable defamation of the sufferer, but I conclude it is enough to consider this requirement as a procedural requirement of necessity to issue provisional injunction.
I have stated procedural requirements to issue order of prior restraint on public matters through provisional disposition procedure by court, however, when these procedural requirements are not met, namely court issues order of prior restraint through provisional injunction procedure without holding oral hearing or examination of respondent, then I can hardly conclude that such order not necessarily infringe the principle of the paragraphs 2 and 1, Article 21 of the Constitution.
I conclude that even in the case that the object of injunction is the expression on matters of public concern such as the valuation or criticism, etc. of public servants or candidates for elective public offices, in some very exceptional cases, it dose not infringe the principle of the Constitution stated above to issue banning order of provisional injunction without fulfilling procedural requirements provided that by the material presented by the petitioner without holding oral hearing to examine the propriety of the defense of the respondent stated above, it is quite obviously found that the contents of the expression are false and has been done with actual malice of the respondent in light of the form and contents of the expression. The reason for this conclusion is as stated in the majority opinion. And judging from the prima facie evidence presented before the court which issued the provisional injunction order in this case, it was clear that the Appellant had actual malice in printing the magazine article in question.
I also conclude that as the Appellant's contention on Jokoku Appeal which claims the infringement of paragraph 2, Article 21 of the Constitution has no ground as is stated in the majority opinion and the other claims of unconstitutionality have no ground as stated above. Accordingly, the Jokoku Appeal should be dismissed.

Justice Koichi Yaguchi
Justice Masami Ito
Justice Masataka Taniguchi
Justice Susumu Ohashi
Justice Keiji Maki
Justice Mitsuhiko Yasuoka
Justice Reijiro Tsunoda
Justice Rokuro Shimatani
Justice Atsushi Nagashima
Justice Masuo Takashima
Justice Akira Fujishima
Justice Tsuneo Ouchi
Justice Yasukazu Kagawa
Justice Toshio Sakaue