1997.09.09

1994 (O) 1287

Minshu Vol. 51, No. 8 at 3850

Judgment concerning the statement made by a Diet member while making questions, etc. within the Diet, and the State's liability for damages

Case to seek damages

Judgment of the Third Petty Bench, dismissed

Sapporo High Court, Judgment of March 15, 1994

Even where a Diet member has, while making questions, speeches, debates, etc. within the Diet, made a statement that harms the fame or reputation of an individual citizen, in order to affirm the State's liability for damages by reason of illegality of such act by the said Diet member under Article 1, para.1 of the Act on State Liability for Compensation, there must be special circumstances where it is obvious that the Diet member has exercised the authority vested in him/her contrary to the purport thereof, including cases where the Diet member has alleged the facts for an illegal or inappropriate purpose irrespective of his/her duties, or has knowingly alleged false facts.

Article 1, para.1 of Act on State Liability for Compensation, Article 710 of the Civil Code, Article 51 of the Constitution, Article 45, para.1 of the Rule of the House of Representatives

Article 1, para.1 of the Act on State Liability for Compensation
(1) When a public officer who is in a position to exercise the public authority of the State or of a public entity has, in the course of performing his/her duties, illegally caused damage to another person either intentionally or negligently, the State or the public entity concerned shall be liable to compensate such damage.

Article 710 of the Civil Code
Persons liable for damages under the provisions of the preceding Article must also compensate for damages other than those to property, regardless of whether the body, liberty or reputation of others have been infringed, or property rights of others have been infringed.

Article 51 of the Constitution
Members of both Houses shall not be held liable outside the House for speeches, debates or votes cast inside the House.

Article 45, para.1 of the Rule of the House of Representatives
Members may ask questions and state their opinions without restrictions regarding any items on the agenda.

The final appeal is dismissed.
The appellant of final appeal shall bear the cost of the final appeal.

Concerning Reason I for final appeal argued by the appellant
I. In this case, the appellant of final appeal alleges that the statement in dispute, which was made by one of the appellees of final appeal, A, in his/her capacity as a Diet member, defamed the appellant's husband C and drove him to suicide, and based on this allegation, the appellant seeks damages from Appellee A under Article 709 and Article 710 of the Civil Code and also seeks damages from the State under Article 1, para.1 of the Act on State Liability for Compensation. The outline of the facts determined by the court of second instance is as follows.
1. At the meeting of the Committee on Social and Labor Affairs of the House of Representatives held on November 21, 1985, in the 103rd Diet, Appellee A, who was a member of the House of Representatives and a member of the said committee at that time, during the deliberation on the bill for partial revision to the Medical Service Act that was on the agenda on that day, pointed out the problems with the said bill in terms of the responsibility of the State for regional medical service plans, the discretion of prefectural governments with regard to medical service areas and facilities, consultation with the Medical Research Council on the formulation of regional medical service plans, and other relevant issues. On this occasion, Appellee A also asked questions about the issues concerning B Hospital in Sapporo City, and made the statement in dispute in the questions. This statement was intended to demand adequate supervision of the competent administrative organ over problematic hospitals from the perspective of protecting human rights of patients.
2. The statement in dispute can be summarized as follows: C, the director of B Hospital, committed indecent acts against five female patients; the director is suspected of not being in normal mental condition due to drug addiction; such a problematic doctor could not be detected under the existing administrative system.

II. The appellant alleges injustice in the judgment of prior instance, arguing that although Appellee A's statement was nothing more than a slander against a particular individual and did not fall within the scope of "speeches, debates or votes" prescribed in Article 51 of the Constitution, the court of second instance dismissed the appellant's claim against Appellee A.
However, according to the facts mentioned above, it is obvious that the statement in dispute was made by Appellee A who was in the position of a Diet member, in the course of performing his/her duties as a Diet member. Therefore, even if making this statement should be deemed to be an illegal act committed by Appellee A with intent or by negligence, we should construe that, apart from the possibility that the State, another appellee, might be held liable for damages, Appellee A, in his/her capacity as a public officer, would not be held liable for damages (See 1953 (O)No. 625, judgment of the Third Petty Bench of the Supreme Court of April 19, 1955, Minshu Vol. 9, No. 5, at 534; and 1974 (O)No. 419, judgment of the Second Petty Bench of the Supreme Court of October 20, 1978, Minshu Vol. 32, No. 7, at 1367). Consequently, without needing to discuss whether or not the statement in dispute falls within the scope of "speeches, debates or votes" prescribed in Article 51 of the Constitution, we should conclude that the appellant's claim against Appellee A is groundless. The determination of the court of second instance that dismissed the said claim in line with this reasoning can be affirmed as justifiable. The appellant's argument is nothing more criticism against the court's holdings that do not affect the conclusion of the judgment of prior instance, and therefore cannot be accepted.

Concerning Reason II for final appeal
I. Article 1, para.1 of the Act on State Liability for Compensation provides that when a public officer who is in a position to exercise the public authority of the State or a public entity has, in breach of the legal obligation that the public officer assumes to an individual citizen in the course of performing his/her official duties, caused damage to the said citizen, the State or the public entity concerned shall be liable to compensate such damage. Whether or not this provision is applicable to a statement made by a Diet member within the Diet depends on whether or not the said statement has been made in breach of the legal obligation that the Diet member assumes to an individual citizen in his/her capacity as a Diet member in the course of performing his/her official duties.

II. The Diet is the highest organ of state power, and it has authority over a wide range of matters that affect the fundamentals of national administration, such as initiation and submission to the people of revisions to the Constitution, lawmaking, approval for conclusion of treaties, designation of the prime minister, establishment of an impeachment court, and supervision of national finance. Under the system of parliamentary democracy adopted by the Constitution of Japan, the Diet is to play a role in coordinating diverse opinions and various interests of citizens through frank discussions by Diet members, with the ultimate goal of making uniform national decisions according to the rule of majority. In order to enable the Diet to exercise such authority effectively and appropriately, Diet members are required to act toward realizing welfare for the citizens as a whole, while taking into account various views of citizens.
For legislative acts, Diet members shall only assume a political responsibility to the citizens as a whole, and shall not assume any legal obligation corresponding to an individual citizen's rights. Therefore, any legislative act by Diet members should not be held illegal under the Act on State Liability for Compensation, except in indeed exceptional cases that are difficult to anticipate, for example, in the case where the Diet dare to make a law despite the fact that the contents of the law is in conflict with an unambiguous language of the Constitution (See 1978 (O) No. 1240, judgment of the First Petty Bench of the Supreme Court of November 21, 1985, Minshu Vol. 39, No. 7, at 1512). This principle is applicable not only to legislative acts but also to all the acts performed by the Diet to make uniform national decisions through to the rule of majority, such as approval for conclusion of treaties and resolutions on supervision of national finance.
On the other hand, questions, speeches, debates, etc. made by Diet members in the course of deliberating approval for conclusion of treaties and supervision of national finance or conducting investigation on other issues on government (hereinafter referred to as "questions, etc.") do not constitute the very acts of making national decisions through the rule of majority, but they are performed with the aim of making national decisions. Since diverse opinions and various interests of citizens should be reflected in the process of making national decisions, a wide range of issues that are actually raised in the society are to be addressed in questions, etc. made by Diet members, and where such questions, etc. relate to or cite a specific case, the contents thereof might directly affect an individual citizen's rights. For this reason, we cannot completely deny the possibility that when making questions, etc., Diet members might assume a legal obligation corresponding to an individual citizen's rights.
However, questions, etc. made by Diet members closely relate to and have influence on the process of making uniform national decisions through the rule of majority, and making questions, etc. from all aspects so as to reflect diverse opinions and various interest of citizens in this process also falls within the scope of duties or missions of Diet members. Therefore, we should consider that what issue should be addressed in questions, etc. and in what manner it should be addressed is left to the broad discretion of Diet members who are authorized to make political decisions, and even if questions, etc. made by a Diet member have resulted in harming an individual citizen's rights, we should construe that the said Diet member cannot be deemed to have breached his/her legal obligation in the course of performing his/her official duties only because of such questions, etc. Article 51 of the Constitution exempts Diet members from legal responsibility for their statements and votes within the Diet, by stipulating that "Members of both Houses shall not be held liable outside the House for speeches, debates or votes cast inside the House." In a sense, this can also be regarded as evidence that supports the necessity of allowing broad discretion to Diet members for their official acts. It is true that since such broad discretion allowed to Diet members is based on the requirement of enabling them to exercise their authority satisfactorily, they are prohibited from conducting any acts that are irrelevant to their duties but aimed to harm an individual citizen's rights. Furthermore, any acts by Diet members of defaming an individual citizen by intentionally alleging false facts cannot be deemed to be legitimate official acts within the scope of their discretion.
Consequently, even where a Diet member has, while making questions, etc. within the Diet, made any statement that harms the fame or reputation of an individual citizen, this would not necessarily be held illegal under Article 1, para.1 of the Act on State Liability for Compensation and would not necessarily make the State liable under said provision. Rather, it is appropriate to construe that in order to find the State's liability for damages for such act by a Diet member, there must be special circumstances where it is obvious that the Diet member has exercised the authority vested in him/her contrary to the purport thereof, including cases where the Diet member has alleged the facts for an illegal or inappropriate purpose irrespective of his/her duties, or has knowingly alleged false facts.

III. In this case, according to the facts mentioned above, the court of second instance held that it is obvious that the statement in dispute was related to a Diet member's duty, namely, deliberation on a law bill. The court also held that Appellee A cannot be found to have made the statement in dispute for an illegal or inappropriate purpose, nor can the contents of the statement be found to be false. Such determination of the court of second instance can be affirmed based on the evidence mentioned in the judgment of prior instance. Consequently, the conclusion of the court of second instance that denied the State's liability under the Act on State Liability for Compensation can be affirmed as justifiable. The judgment of prior instance does not contain such illegality as argued by the appellant, and the appellant's argument cannot be accepted.

Therefore, according to Article 401, Article 95, and Article 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the judgment has been rendered in the form of the main text by the unanimous consent of the Justices.

Justice OZAKI Yukinobu
Justice SONOBE Itsuo
Justice ONO Masao
Justice CHIKUSA Hideo
Justice YAMAGUCHI Shigeru