Judgments of the Supreme Court

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2007 (A) 398

Date of the judgment (decision)

2007.10.16

Case Number

2007 (A) 398

Reporter

Keishu Vol. 61, No. 7

Title

Decision concerning the meaning of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt," the standard of proof required to find guilt

Case name

Case to be brought for violation of the Explosives Control Act and attempt of homicide

Result

Decision of the First Petty Bench, dismissed

Court of the Prior Instance

Takamatsu High Court, Judgment of January 30, 2007

Summary of the judgment (decision)

1. "Proof beyond a reasonable doubt," the standard of proof required to find guilt, does not require that there is no room at all to have any doubt about the existence of any fact contrary to the charged fact, but it means that even where there is room, as an abstract possibility, to have a doubt about the existence of a contrary fact, if, in light of the sound, social common sense, such doubt is generally judged to be unreasonable, the court may find guilt.

2. There is no difference in the meaning of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" as the standard of proof required to find guilt between a case where findings of fact should be made based on direct evidence and a case where findings of fact should be made based on circumstantial evidence.

References

(Concerning 1 and 2) Article 317, Article 318, and Article 333, para.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

Article 317 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(Trial on Evidence)
Facts shall be found on the basis of evidence.

Article 318 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(Free Determination by Judge)
The probative value of evidence shall be left to the free determination by a judge.

Article 333, para.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(Judgment to Render Sentence)
Where an offense has been proven with regard to a case charged to the court, a sentence shall be rendered by a judgment, except in the case set forth in Article 334.

Main text of the judgment (decision)

The final appeal is dismissed.

Reasons

Among the reasons for final appeal argued by the defense counsels, YOSHIDA Shigeru and KUWASHIRO Hideki, the reason alleging violation of a judicial precedent is irrelevant in this case because the cited judicial precedent addresses a different type of facts, and the rest are in effect nothing more than assertions of errors in fact-finding, and the reasons for final appeal argued by the accused are assertions of errors in fact-finding, and none of them can be regarded as a reason for final appeal permissible under Article 405 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
After considering these assertions, however, we decided to make judgment by this court's own authority.
1. The facts constituting the crimes charged in this case are as follows. The accused, with the intent to kill A, the natural mother of his wife with whom he was in a suit for divorce, and other persons concerned, made an explosive by connecting a considerable quantity of triacetone triperoxide or peroxide acetone produced from acetone and other chemicals (hereinafter referred to as "TATP") with a detonating device consisting of an ignition heater, battery, etc. and putting it into a file case, and then putting this case into a nonstandard-size postal envelope in a manner that when the case is pulled out of the envelope, the detonating device is activated and the TATP explodes (this explosive is hereinafter be referred to as the "Explosive"). Then, the accused sent the Explosive as a nonstandard-sized postal item addressed to A and had a postal delivery officer, who was not aware of the accused's intention, deliver the postal item to A's residence located in Takamatsu City, thereby having A who received it pull the case out of the envelope and cause an explosion. Thus, the accused used an explosive and attempted to kill three persons including A, but failed to kill them, only seriously or slightly injuring them. For these facts, the accused is charged with violation of the Explosives Control Act and attempt of homicide.

2. The court of first instance found the following facts. (1) About eight days prior to the occurrence of the explosion of the Explosive (hereinafter referred to as the "Explosion"), the accused had, by using the computer placed at his residence, accessed and browsed via the Internet websites which provide information on the methods for producing explosive substances including TATP and methods for making detonating devices, and it can be presumed that the accused had actually handled explosive substances stored in plastic cases. (2) Prior to the Explosion, the accused had purchased acetone and other chemicals with which it is possible to produce TATP in the quantity that seems to have been used to produce the Explosive, and had also purchased or held materials that are identical or similar to a number of constituent parts of the Explosive such as the detonating agent used for its detonating device. Metallic powder to which TATP adhered was also discovered at the accused's residence. (3) Among the 24 postal stamps affixed to the envelope into which the Explosive was put, nine stamps were issued and sold by the vending machine installed at the Nagao Postal Office (Sanuki City, Kagawa Prefecture) on the day preceding the date of the Explosion. The three postal stamps discovered and seized from the accused's residence were issued and sold by the same vending machine two minutes after the said nine stamps were issued and sold. (4) The paper slip indicating the sender that was affixed to the envelope was prepared by extracting data placed on a page of a credit card company's website that provided information on its Takamatsu branch office with a map thereof, and then by printing the data on labels using a color printer. The accused had browsed said website six days prior to the Explosion, and a color printer that is capable of such printing and the same kinds of labels were discovered at the accused's residence. (5) The envelope in question seems to have been put into a mailbox with a relatively wide slot located within the area covered by the Takamatsu Minami Postal Office during a certain period of time on the day preceding the Explosion, and during that period, the accused went to a place within the area covered by the said postal office where a mailbox capable of accepting the envelope is located. The court of first instance, by taking into consideration all of these facts, found that the accused produced the Explosive and sent it to A by mail. Also, the court, in light of the accused's awareness of the power of the Explosive as well as the fact that at the time of the occurrence of the Explosion, the accused might have a reason to intend to kill the victims including A, the natural mother of his wife, due to the dispute over divorce, found that the accused's act involved a definite intent to kill A and also involved willful negligence that could result in the death of the other two victims who actually were only injured in the Explosion. The judgment of prior instance affirmed these findings of the judgment of first instance.

3. The appeal counsels point out, with regard to the fact mentioned in 2(2) above, the possibility that the accused purchased the acetone and other chemicals in question but he used them for other purposes, and also point out, with regard to the fact mentioned in 2(3) above, the possibility that with regard to at least ten stamps other than those for which the place where they were purchased is identified among the postal stamps affixed to the envelope in question, the accused could not have purchased them. By doing so, the appeal counsels allege that in the process of making findings of fact by referring to indirect facts based on circumstantial evidence, the court of second instance found the accused's guilt despite lack of enough certainty to deny the possibility of the existence of any facts contrary thereto.
In order to find guilt in criminal proceedings, it is necessary to prove it to the extent beyond a reasonable doubt. However, this standard does not require that there is no room at all to have any doubt about the existence of any fact contrary to the charged fact, but it means that even where there is room, as an abstract possibility, to have a doubt about the existence of a contrary fact, if, in light of the sound, social common sense, such doubt is generally judged to be unreasonable, the court may find guilt. This applies equally to the case where findings of fact should be made based on direct evidence and the case where findings of fact should be made based on circumstantial evidence.
In this case, the court is required to perform the fact-finding process exclusively based on circumstantial evidence. The judgment of first instance affirmed by the judgment of prior instance found, by taking into consideration all of the circumstantial evidence described above, that it was established to the extent beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed the charged crimes. This finding can be deemed to be justifiable.

Therefore, according to Article 414 and Article 386, para.1, item 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the decision has been rendered in the form of the main text by the unanimous consent of the Justices.

Presiding Judge

Justice IZUMI Tokuji
Justice YOKOO Kazuko
Justice KAINAKA Tatsuo
Justice SAIGUCHI Chiharu
Justice WAKUI Norio

(This translation is provisional and subject to revision.)