2025.03.03

2024(Kyo)31

Minshu Vol. 79, No. 3

(Civil Case) Decision concerning whether an act that constitutes a tort under Article 709 of the Civil Code corresponds to the act that is "in violation of laws and regulations" as referred to in Article 81, paragraph (1), item (i) of the Religious Corporations Act

Case of appeal with permission against the ruling to dismiss the appeal against the ruling to impose a civil fine

Decision of the First Petty Bench, dismissed

Tokyo High Court, Decision of August 27, 2024

An act that constitutes a tort under Article 709 of the Civil Code corresponds to the act that is "in violation of laws and regulations" as referred to in Article 81, paragraph (1), item (i) of the Religious Corporations Act.

Article 709 of the Civil Code; Article 81, paragraph (1), item (i) of the Religious Corporations Act

The appeal is dismissed. The costs for the appeal shall be borne by the appellant.

I. Concerning Reason I for appeal stated by the counsel for appeal, FUKUMOTO Nobuya, KANETSUKI Yu, and HORIKAWA Atsushi 1. According to the case records, the developments of this case are as follows. (1) Article 81, paragraph (1) of the Religious Corporations Act (referred to below as the "Act") provides that when the court finds that a cause which falls under any of the items of that paragraph exists with regard to a religious corporation, it may order the dissolution of the religious corporation at the request, etc. of the competent authority, and item (i) of that paragraph states "in violation of laws and regulations, the religious corporation commits an act which is clearly found to harm public welfare substantially." Article 78-2, paragraph (1) of the Act provides that when the competent authority finds that a religious corporation is suspected of falling under any of the items of that paragraph, the authority may, subject to the extent necessary for enforcing the Act, request the relevant religious corporation to submit reports with regard to matters concerning the administration and operation of business affairs or enterprises of the relevant religious corporation, and item (iii) of that paragraph states "a cause which falls under any of Article 81, paragraph (1), items (i) through (iv) exists with regard to the relevant religious corporation." (2) The Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, who serves as the competent authority for the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification (a religious corporation; referred to below as the "Corporation"), found that there was a suspicion that a cause that falls under Article 81, paragraph (1), item (i) of the Act existed with regard to the Corporation in view of the facts such as that the followers of the Corporation were held liable to compensate for damage in the court judgments of the 22 civil lawsuits on the grounds that their acts including soliciting donations to the Corporation constitutes a tort under Article 709 of the Civil Code, and during the period from November 2022 to July 2023, the Minister requested the Corporation to submit reports under Article 78-2, paragraph (1) of the Act seven times. However, the Corporation failed to report part of the matters for which reports were requested. In September 2023, the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology notified the Tokyo District Court that the appellant, who is the representative officer of the Corporation, should be punished by a civil fine, on the grounds that the Corporation's failure to submit reports as mentioned above falls under Article 88, item (x) of the Act, which provides for the case in which a representative officer, etc. of a religious corporation is to be punished by a civil fine. In March 2024, the Tokyo District Court rendered a decision to impose a civil fine of 100,000 yen on the appellant (the decision in first instance). 2. The court of prior instance determined that an act that constitutes a tort under Article 709 of the Civil Code corresponds to an act that is "in violation of laws and regulations" as referred to in Article 81, paragraph (1), item (i) of the Act, and in light of the contents of the court judgments mentioned above, it found that at the time the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology requested the Corporation to submit reports under Article 78-2, paragraph (1) of the Act, there was a suspicion that a cause that falls under Article 81, paragraph (1), item (i) of the Act existed with regard to the Corporation, and therefore that the Minister's request for reports from the Corporation was legal. In conclusion, the court of prior instance dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant against the decision in first instance. 3. The counsel argue that the determination by the court of prior instance mentioned above contains errors in the interpretation and application of the relevant laws and regulations and violates the judicial precedents, stating that: Article 709 of the Civil Code only provides that a person who has committed a certain act is liable to compensate for damage and it does not provide that the relevant act is prohibited; an act that constitutes a tort that is referred to in Article 709 of the Civil Code is not an act that is in violation of that Article, and therefore it cannot be regarded as corresponding to an act that is "in violation of laws and regulations" as referred to in Article 81, paragraph (1), item (i) of the Act. 4. However, although Article 709 of the Civil Code cannot be regarded as providing that a certain act is prohibited, an act that constitutes a tort under that Article is an act that is judged to be illegal under tort law, that is, an act that is in violation of a certain legal norm, and the person who has committed such act is held liable to compensate for damage pursuant to that Article, which is a provision of a law. In view of these points, interpreting that an act that constitutes a tort under Article 709 of the Civil Code corresponds to an act that is "in violation of laws and regulations" as referred to in Article 81, paragraph (1), item (i) of the Act is not contrary to the literal meaning of that item. It should rather be said that the interpretation presented above is consistent with the purport of that item. The Act is intended to confer legal capacity on religious organizations in order to facilitate their ownership of establishments for worship and other properties, and maintenance and utilization of such properties, etc. (Article 1, paragraph (1) of the Act), and provides that a religious organization may be granted legal personality (Article 4 of the Act). As a cause for issuing an order of dissolution of a religious corporation, Article 81, paragraph (1), item (i) of the Act states the case where "in violation of laws and regulations the religious corporation commits an act which is clearly found to harm public welfare substantially", and the prescribed intention of that item is to make it possible to dissolve a religious corporation by compulsion through judicial proceedings and to deprive the corporation of its legal personality when the cause set forth in that item exists, because it is inappropriate to allow a religious organization to maintain its legal capacity in such situation (see 1996 (Ku) 8, the decision of the First Petty Bench of the Supreme Court of January 30, 1996, Minshu Vol. 50, No. 1, at 199). Given that, since an act that constitutes a tort under Article 709 of the Civil Code is an act by which a person intentionally or negligently infringes the rights or legally protected interests of another person, such act is highly likely to give rise to circumstances where the relevant act is clearly found to harm public welfare substantially and for which it would be inappropriate to allow the religious organization involved in that act to maintain its legal capacity. Consequently, it should be said that it is consistent with the intention of Article 81, paragraph (1), item (i) of the Act mentioned above to interpret that an act that constitutes a tort under Article 709 of the Civil Code corresponds to an act that is "in violation of laws and regulations" as referred to in that item. In addition, an order of dissolution is effective only in depriving a religious corporation of its legal personality and it does not have any legal effect in prohibiting or restricting religious acts conducted by religious followers (see the decision of the First Petty Bench of the Supreme Court in 1996 mentioned above). In order for a certain act to be deemed to correspond to the act stated in that item, it must be an act that is not only in violation of laws and regulations but is also clearly found to harm public welfare substantially. In light of these points, the provisions of that item, even when interpreted as described above, cannot be said to be unclear or overly loose in specifying a cause for issuing an order of dissolution of a religious corporation. According to the above, it is appropriate to consider that an act that constitutes a tort under Article 709 of the Civil Code corresponds to an act that is "in violation of laws and regulations" as referred to in Article 81, paragraph (1), item (i) of the Act. 5. The determination by the court of prior instance to the same effect as above is justifiable and can be upheld. All the judicial precedents cited in the counsel's arguments are irrelevant in this case because they addressed different types of facts. The counsel's arguments cannot be accepted. II. Concerning other reasons for appeal The determination by the court of prior instance regarding the points argued by the counsel is justifiable and can be upheld. The counsel argue that it cannot be said that a cause that falls under Article 81, paragraph (1), item (i) of the Act exists with regard to a religious corporation unless the representative officer or any other executive member of the religious corporation commits the act stated in that item. However, such limitation is not found in the wording of the main sentence of that paragraph or that item, and there are no other grounds for interpreting that item as argued by the counsel. The counsel's arguments cannot be accepted. For the reasons stated above, the Court unanimously decides as set forth in the main text of the decision.

Justice NAKAMURA Makoto Justice YASUNAMI Ryosuke Justice OKA Masaaki Justice SAKAI Toru Justice MIYAGAWA Mitsuko